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Résumé: L'émergence d'un plus large spectre de vulnérabilités (terrorisme, sabotage, conflits locaux et 
catastrophes naturelles) et l'interdépendance croissante de l'activité économique rendent 
particulièrement vulnérables les grands réseaux vitaux des pays industrialisés. Pour y faire 
face, des actions importantes doivent être menées à une échelle nationale, en particulier par le 
développement de partenariats étroits entre le secteur public et la sphère privée. 
Cet article analyse l'initiative présidentielle lancée dès 1996 aux Etats-Unis -premier pays au 
monde à inscrire ces questions à l'agenda  du plus haut niveau décisionnel- ainsi que la 
structure nationale de partenariats mis en place depuis lors. Une telle démarche pourrait 
constituer un point de départ pour d'autres pays désireux d'élaborer leur propre analyse de 
vulnérabilités et leur stratégie d'amélioration. 
Les événements du 11 septembre 2001, comme les attaques à l'anthrax, ont néanmoins montré 
que les avancées américaines ne constituaient qu'une première étape d'un processus plus 
global de préparation nationale; les infrastructures critiques des Etats-Unis demeurent 
hautement vulnérables. Enfin, plusieurs idées fausses, par trop souvent récurrentes, doivent 
être dépassées pour traiter beaucoup plus efficacement ces risques à grande échelle sur un 
plan international. 
 
Abstract: The emergence of a larger threat spectrum -terrorism, sabotage, local conflicts, political 
unrest, and natural disasters- combined with the growing globalization of economic activities, 
makes networks highly vulnerable. Rethinking national vulnerabilities requires the creation 
and the improvement of long-term public-private partnerships.  
The article discusses the US Presidential initiative launched in 1996 -the first initiative 
worldwide to put these issues on the top-level agenda- as well as the national structure of 
developed partnerships. It might constitute a starting point for other countries to develop their 
own national strategy, adapting it of course to their own national particularities. 
Terrorists attacks in 2001 show, however, that such an initiative constitutes nothing but a first 
step in a general process to build preparedness nationwide; America still remains highly 
vulnerable. I conclude with a few myths that must be confronted to deal more efficiently with 
these new large-scale risks at an international level. 
 
Mots clés : Risques à grande échelle - nouvelles vulnérabilites - sécurité nationale - infrastructures 
critiques - préparation collective - partenariats public-privés 
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Introduction 
 
  “On October 22nd the center staff began debating […] was the postal system itself 
contaminated? Should it be down?” (Lipton and Johnson, 2001). Crisis at the federal Center 
for Disease Control (CDC). Shutting down a large-scale network such as the US Postal 
Service, the officials knew, would inflict debilitating impacts on the economic and social 
continuity of the country as well as increase stress on the already sensitive psyche of the 
nation under siege.  
Several weeks before, 9/11 terrorists made use of some elements (aircraft) of another 
critical network –commercial aviation– and questions were similar: How many aircraft have 
been hijacked? Is large part of the US airline network under the attacker’s control? And the 
ultimate alternatives for authorities were the same: Should the closing of the entire US 
airspace to all flights be ordered? To stop all the aircraft that could have been hijacked, 
Federal Aviation Administration shut down airspace over United States to commercial traffic 
minutes after the two commercial jets slam into World Trade Center, first time government 
had taken such drastic step. As stopping the postal service would not allow avoiding future 
contamination if the whole system was already contaminated –one day, it would have been 
necessary to reopen it– the network was not closed. And 2001 events were likely to raise 
fundamental challenges for the security of national infrastructures1 not only in the US, but 
also at the international level. A simple but crucial question emerges: How can we improve 
collective preparedness? 
 
The present contribution to the JCCM special issue aims to suggest some ways of 
possible collective awareness to face emerging crisis situations due to large-scale breakdown 
or disruption of the critical infrastructures of a country. Developing partnerships between the 
public sector and the industry at a high decisional level is a key to adapt the organizations’ 
readiness to new sources as well as new scales of possible disruption. In 1996, a first initiative 
was taken in the US to deal with those emerging large-scale risks. President Clinton launched 
a national study, which involved both the government (federal executives, state and local 
authorities) and private industry, to better understand the vulnerabilities of elements of the US 
infrastructure and key assets that could be critical to the business and social continuity of the 
                                                 
1 For a deep analysis of the impact of anthrax crisis on long-term strategic aspects of the USPS’s operation, see 
Reisner (2002). 
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country. The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative remains 
unique worldwide as a preventive presidential involvement.  
Most European and Asian countries still have paid little attention to those questions at 
a national level. In light of the 2001 attacks and under current pressure due to the high degree 
of uncertainty on the international scene, the US initiative may constitute, at least partially, a 
framework to build up collective intelligence and initiatives to better assess the vulnerabilities 
of interdependent critical networks and managing them (Michel-Kerjan, 2003).   
 
This paper proceeds as follows. After the presentation of some characteristics of 
emerging threats, the emphasis is put on the necessity to officially clarify the true level of the 
stakes imposed by global issues of critical infrastructure security. Rethinking the 
vulnerabilities of interconnected networks, I present the national objectives of the 
preparedness program launched under the recommendations of the US Presidential 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The outlines of this program, based upon an 
extended collaboration between the public and the private sectors, are then presented. Who 
are the key actors? What are their roles? What is their degree of interconnectivity?  
As 2001 terrorist attacks dramatically showed, such an initiative constitutes, however, nothing 
but a first step in a general process to build preparedness at a national level; America still 
remains vulnerable. I conclude with a few myths we need to confront if we want to efficiently 
improve our capacity to deal with those new large-scale risks at an international level2.  
 
Emerging threats 
 
All terrorist attacks reach a similar goal: creating fear in the targeted country. 
Terrorism is of course not a new risk, but the scale as well as the configuration of those 
attacks was rather different than more traditional terrorist attacks such as car or luggage 
bombing (Vareilles, 2001). What do the 9/11 events and the anthrax mailings have in 
common?  The 2001 attacks were not physically directed against specific elements of the 
infrastructure. By using only four contaminated letters, attackers took great advantage of the 
vast capacity of the complex network of the US Postal Service3. The new aspect is that the 
                                                 
2 Let’s be absolutely clear. The purpose here is to offer a general picture –at a given time– of the initiatives 
launched in the US before 2001. The created partnerships are of course still evolving. And above all, those 
questions may evolve very quickly in the short run.  
3 For more details regarding the management of anthrax episodes by the USPS, see the contribution by Thomas 
Day in this special issue; Day (2003). 
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network itself served as a tool to diffuse and build a larger scale of threats: every envelop 
could have been considered as being contaminated, a potential weapon. One of the most 
useful and common services was becoming a source of dread about biological attacks; 
everyone was becoming a potential target. That configuration could have been considered 
only specific to the postal services. Unfortunately, even a short analysis of the dramatic 
September 11, 2001 events shows that the method used by terrorists is comparable in a sense 
that they used few elements (aircraft) of a huge network (civil aviation). As a result, all 
aircraft were potentially at risk. 
It is one of the key lessons of those crises, which translate to a new dimension of 
potential destabilizations within industries operating those networks. New large-scale 
vulnerabilities do emerge: our critical networks can be used and reversed against ourselves as 
weapons for diffusing attacks and alerts throughout a country, all the elements of the network 
becoming potentially at risk. 
At least three characteristics of those new large-scale risks stand out.  
A first one is the asymmetric value of the attack: a small-scale but carefully targeted attack 
can cause large-scale reactions because of strong network interdependencies and possible 
cascading fallout. For instance, introducing a pathogenic agent into a nationwide distribution 
network may require small financial investments from attackers compared with the resulting 
national impact of such an action on the health and business continuity of a country. On 9/11, 
the terrorists did not use advanced technology to attack the US. By using only box cutters, 
they hijacked commercial aircraft and crashed them into civilian and government targets. 
A second characteristic is the existence of an evolving uncertainty: terrorists can purposefully 
adopt their strategy of attacks based on their information on vulnerabilities of the systems and 
choose more vulnerable targets with respect to such information (Michel-Kerjan, 2002). The 
fact that attackers can choose numerous different targets implies that a huge number of 
potential targets need to be protected, which requires significant amount of money. 
Uncertainty as to targets as well as the tools that could be used to attack makes the security 
task very difficult to manage. Ambiguity is a complex component for decision-making. 
Third, there is a global interdependence among similar infrastructures worldwide. No country 
is an island entire to itself; each national network can also be part of a global international 
network. For instance, the anthrax threats not only destabilized the USPS but also the whole 
postal activity in a lot of countries. The globalization of activities is growing. Combined with 
the emergence of a larger threat spectrum –terrorism, sabotage, local conflicts, political 
unrest, and natural disasters– that trend makes critical networks highly vulnerable not only to 
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direct attacks but also to cascading consequences of attacks against another similar 
infrastructure abroad. Thus, single events will be able to generate very quickly debilitating 
impacts on a whole country and, by networks’ interdependence, will trigger major economic 
and social destabilization internationally4.  
 
This kind of crisis has little to do with well-known local major events such as local industrial 
accidents or floods. Here, the stake is to manage large-scale risks using large-scale sets of 
critical infrastructure being capable of inflicting significant consequences to a whole country. 
That requires a national and even international level of answers based upon development of 
public-private partnerships to deal with those emerging risks. 
 
 
Putting the “Critical Infrastructures” issue on the agenda 
 
The first initiative worldwide to seriously consider at a national level the question of 
critical infrastructure security has been launched by the United States. It was five years before 
the 9/11 events and the anthrax attacks. In 1996, President Clinton established the President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Its goals were, precisely, to start dealing 
with those issues at the highest level. Conducting a 15-month study, the Presidential 
Commission studied with private sector representatives as well as academics and civil society 
representatives how each element of the infrastructure operates, how it might be vulnerable to 
breakdown or failure due to physical or cyber-attacks and what might be the cascading effect 
on other networks. On October 1997, The President’s Commission issued its report 
(President’s Commission, 1997). Assessing major vulnerabilities of key infrastructures of the 
country was a first step of an ambitious program aimed to develop collaboration between 
government and the private sector by creating a global architecture of partnerships on those 
common concerns. Such a Presidential initiative provides two clues: first, it officially clarifies 
the real stakes associated with the protection of large-scale critical networks; second, it put 
officially this question on the agenda of the highest political and decisional level; by so doing, 
that matter immediately became a national concern. 
 
                                                 
4 As far as civil aviation is concerned, the 9/11 events not only impacted on the US airlines. Aviation insurers 
decided to cancel their third party liability policies for all airline companies in the world with only a seven-day 
notice, with immediate and worldwide impacts. 
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A new mindset: rethinking national vulnerabilities 
 
Critical infrastructures 
What are the “critical infrastructures”? The infrastructure of the United States –as one 
of the most of industrialized countries– is a complex system of interrelated elements. These 
elements have become increasingly more concentrated and more interconnected than ever. 
Among certain elements of the infrastructure, some are so critical that if they were destroyed 
or even simply disrupted, an entire region, if not the whole country, could be debilitated.  
Critical infrastructures can be defined as “industries, institutions and distribution networks 
and systems that provide a continual flow of the goods and services essential to a country’s 
defense and economic security and to the health, welfare and safety of its citizens” 
(President’s Commission, 1997). Five major sectors can usually be considered critical: 
Critical Human Services, Information and Telecommunications, Energy, Banking and 
Finance as well as Physical distribution. 
Some subsectors, which are themselves complex networks, provide the essential goods and 
services for citizens to survive. Water, food and agriculture as well as emergency services and 
public health are some of them. The operation of governmental services (including Defense) 
is also critical to administer key public functions. They are usually grouped as Vital Human 
Services. The Information and Telecommunications sectors along with the Energy 
(Electricity, Oil, Natural Gas) sector are also critical as most of the operation of the other 
networks depends on the reliable operation of those sectors. For instance, when the PanAmSat 
Galaxy IV communication satellite failed in May 1998, nearly 80% of the digital pagers in the 
US went off-line (information). Numerous credit card authorizations and ATM transactions 
were affected (banking), as were radio stations and broadcast transmissions 
(telecommunications). As doctors and other emergency services could not be paged, the 
country was immediately facing a crisis in emergency communication, highly critical in the 
healthcare system (vital human services).  
The Banking and Finance (banks as well as financial markets) sector and Physical 
distribution (Airports, Ports, Subways, Highways, Rails, Postal services and shipping) sector 
also touch everyday life.  
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Such a categorization is obviously neither definitive nor exhaustive5. However, separating 
specific sectors helps clarifying the general picture and presents a good framework to deal 
with the potential vulnerabilities each of them may face6. A disruption of any of those 
networks has immediate paralyzing effects and can produce cascading fallouts over several 
interdependent operating networks7.  
 
Lack of interconnected preparedness 
What did the Presidential Commission highlight in its 1997 report? Its 15-month work, which 
corresponded to a vulnerability recognition phase, showed numerous generic pitfalls in the US 
infrastructure. Two of them are particularly important for our purpose here.  
First, the Commission highlighted a general underestimation of the vulnerabilities themselves. 
This is not surprising: in an increasingly competitive world, security (outside of conventional 
area of responsibility, culture, technical habits) used to be the last thing executives would be 
eager to spend money on. Many private sector operators considered the administrative and 
inspection work of regulatory and enforcement officials as making them waste of their time. 
Moreover, the high speed and potential ubiquity of incoming attacks were radically off 
cultural references: on the top-management side, there is still the idea that “you are your boss 
in your walls”, which is actually no longer the fact when attack occurs. And the trend toward 
decentralization in organizational decision-making exacerbates this tendency. 
Second, there was little information sharing between the government and the private sector 
regarding vulnerability assessment and preparedness programs. There was a lack of global 
warning system to alert network operators in case of an attack. It was a crucial statement as, it 
must be stressed, the private sector is the principal provider of goods and services and owner 
of 85% of the US infrastructure (Gilmore Commission, 2001). And even governmental 
functions strongly depend on the reliable operation of privately owned networks. Moreover, 
information sharing among government components (federal, state, local governments) was 
                                                 
5 In this paper, the expression “critical infrastructures” has to be understood in a general sense; i.e. encompassing 
physical, cyber and other non-cyber-related critical infrastructures. 
6 Each of those sectors and subsectors taken separately is a very complex network. Geographical subnetworks 
that are also vital networks for the citizens, firms and other organizations living and operating in those areas, 
which depend on them in that area, compose each of them. So there is high interdependence in these elements of 
the infrastructure. Second, most of these networks can be greatly interdependent with each other. For instance, 
the finance sector needs reliable telecommunications, which needs electricity. 
7 Quite surprisingly, little academic work has been done in social sciences on the issue of risks due to national 
interdependency and the most fruitful contributions are just forthcoming (Kunreuther and Heal, in press; Heal 
and Kunreuther, 2003; Kunreuther, Heal and Orszag, 2002). Early ideas by Perrow (1984) discussed a similar 
issue at a local level by analyzing tight and loose coupling tendencies in several domains among which industrial 
accidents; on more recent concerns after 9/11 events, see Little (2002). 
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quite poor at that the time. And, according to the report of the Commission, the situation 
within companies in the private sector was quite similar (President’s Commission, 1997).  
 
National strategy: creating interconnected public-private partnerships 
 
A National Ambition 
How to deal with this situation? How to create adequate answers involving key 
stakeholders? Critical infrastructures are national networks. Until 1998, the missing element 
was, precisely, the definition and implementation of a national strategy to deal with those 
issues and coordinate actions more efficiently. The President’s Commission resulted in the 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) on May 1998 (White House, 1998). PDD 63 
described a strategy for cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to protact 
critical infrastructures. Post 1998, and after assessing vulnerability, the second step of a global 
improvement process was there initiated to build a national framework for “promoting 
national partnerships with different roles to play between governments (federal, state, local) 
and infrastructures owners and operators to assess and manage new vulnerabilities from 
terrorism or malicious acts (physical or cyber attacks)” (PDD 63, White House, 1998). Such a 
global framework was recognized as essential to create a dynamic process of risk assessment 
and risk mitigation (increasing the potentiality that an attack on a critical infrastructure will 
fail as well as minimizing the disruptive impact of a successful attack).  
At a federal level, responsibilities within the departments and lead agencies as sector 
liaisons for protecting critical infrastructures were established. An adequate answer is the 
creation of new structures acting as specialized interfaces at a national level: the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center 
(NIPC) were created in May 19988.  
On the industry side, first answers were also developed. The Partnership for Critical 
Infrastructure Security (PCIS) was established in December 1999, along with the Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are specific for each critical subsector, some of 
which are still ongoing.  
The main mission and the level of operation of those national framework’s pillars 
depicted hereafter in Figure 1 are now presented. 
 
                                                 
8 Hence, those new structures were established and developed before 9/11 and the subsequent changes 
occasioned by the creation in 2003 of the Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Act of 2002). 
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Lead agencies for sector liaisons 
At the federal level, for each critical infrastructure sector, there is a single 
department/agency, which serves as the lead agency for liaison among the different levels of 
government as well as with the related industry. For instance, the Environmental Protection 
Agency is the lead sector liaison for water supply; the Treasury Department is the lead 
department for the Banking and Finance sector. 
 
The CIAO: coordinating the federal initiatives 
The mission of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) in the Department 
of Commerce is to identify the capabilities and responsibilities of the lead federal departments 
and agencies for infrastructure’s continuity. Its role is also to coordinate initiatives of the 
federal government in critical infrastructure assurance as well as to raise national awareness 
about those issues. The CIAO also facilitates the partnership between the federal government, 
state and local governments to accomplish national assurance policy, planning and programs9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Public-private partnerships in US Critical Infrastructures in 2002 
 
Finally, the CIAO is also involved in supporting the National Infrastructure Assurance 
Council (NIAC), a Presidential advisory committee composed of nearly 30 private sector 
representatives for critical infrastructure assurance policy making. 
                                                 
9 The CIAO –in coordination with other federal departments and the private sector– recently elaborated the 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (White House, February 
2003), which provides a helpful overview of the recent efforts to assess infrastructures and key assets realized by 
most infrastructure sectors. 
President 
of the United States
US Federal Departments: Lead Agencies / Sector Liaisons
Critical Infrastructure Industry / Sector Coordinators
PCIS
ISAC
CIAO
State and Local Governments
ISAC
NIPC
FBI
NIAC
INDUSTRY
FEDERAL
ISAC
Foreign 
Services
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The NIPC: A Warning Center 
The mission of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the FBI is to 
provide a national focal point to gathering information on threats to critical infrastructures. It 
includes investigators and analysts of several agencies among which the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
Agency, the US Secret Service and the FBI as well as the Department of Transportation, the 
Department of Energy or the Department of Commerce and the United States Postal Service. 
 
It is one of the main means of facilitating and coordinating the federal governmental 
response to an incident as well as monitoring reconstitution efforts and mitigating attacks or 
investigating threats.  For instance, the NIPC is linked electronically to the rest of the federal 
government, including other warning and operation centers, including the private sector 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (see below). The center is also reinforcing 
connectivity with similar centers in Australia, Canada and the UK as well as with other NIPC-
like entities in foreign countries among which Japan, Israel, Germany and Sweden. Increasing 
the sharing of information between federal department/agencies and infrastructure owners and 
operators on threats, new vulnerabilities, interdependencies and ongoing attacks, and doing 
that both at national and international levels, the NIPC can be considered as the cornerstone of 
a national warning system (Figure 1). 
  
The PCIS: a national response, from the industry 
As we mentioned above, the largest part of US infrastructure is privately owned. 
Because of that, the private sector would be the most exposed to malicious acts against critical 
networks. Industry responded to the government initiatives by launching the Partnership for 
Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) in December 1999. The mission of that partnership is 
precisely to create and develop a cross-industry dialogue and to share experience among the 
private operators to improve effectiveness and efficiency of individual sector assurance 
efforts. 
The PCIS also coordinates cross-sector initiatives launched by sector coordinators (analogous 
to the sector liaisons at the federal level) and complements public-private efforts to assure 
reliable provision of critical services to deal with emerging risks. It has obviously developed 
close relationships with CIAO for facilitating federal organizations as well as local and state-
level ones to becoming effective partners of the industry. For instance, the CIAO began to 
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forge a broad based partnership between the industry and the government in supporting the 
PCIS and in launching a nation-wide outreach program targeting senior corporate leaders to 
make critical network assurance a matter of corporate governance and risk management10. 
Last but not least, the NIPC has also an access to the President’s office through the 
National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC)11. That constitutes a strong signal of the 
importance for the highest level of the country of the private sector’s viewpoint and 
recommendations (Figure 1). 
 
ISACs: warning centers for critical industries  
 As a result of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (White House, 1998), most of the 
critical infrastructures have organized themselves into Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers or ISACs. An ISAC is typically an industry-led mechanism for gathering, analyzing 
and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating sector-specific information to their members 
and the NIPC.  
 ISACs are generally financed by their members and are designed by various sectors to 
meet their respective needs to acquire timely information about activities that could impact on 
their day-to-day operations. Hence the establishment and operation of an ISAC actually 
requires tremendous cooperation between its members. Because of that it also requires a well-
defined preparedness model as each of the members has unique characteristics, which pose 
unique security challenges. 
 Among ISACs operating to date are the Financial services ISAC established in autumn 
1999, the Telecommunication ISAC, the Electric power ISAC as well as the ones related to 
Information technology and e-commerce firms, Energy (oil & natural gas), Food industry, 
Emergency fire serves, Water supply, Surface transportation, Aviation, and the Chemical 
industry ISAC12. 
 
 Scaling the answer to the problem 
Through the creation of those entities and by developing awareness at different levels of 
operation in the government as well as in the private industry, the general architecture of the 
existing partnerships that have been developed since 1998 responds to a global problem –
                                                 
10 See the testimony of J. Tritak, director of the CIAO, before the US Senate; Tritak (2001). 
11 Executive Order 13231 replaces this council with the National Infrastructure Advisory Council. 
12 For a recent review of the activities of some of those ISACs, see GAO (2003). 
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attacks can be launched everywhere– by a high-level global framework of partnerships. 
Figure 1 illustrates that global configuration13.  
 
America the Vulnerable 
 
With the development of such a global architecture of multi-level partnerships, the 
United States has been forging for the last 6 years an unprecedented effort of vulnerability 
recognition as well as the first significant initiatives towards more cooperation throughout 
federal departments and agencies, state and local governments and the private industry as 
well. It is, of course, only the beginning of a whole costly and long-term security 
improvement process. After building up a national framework –the building phase–, it may 
take a long time to make those partnerships fully operational. Moreover, at lower stages in 
these partnerships, the operational level has also to understand its role within the new national 
architecture. The operational phase will not be an easy task. It will require collective 
engagement as well as time, energy and money.  
September 11, 2001 and the anthrax mailings showed the extent to which the US remained 
unprotected. As pointed out by a recent report by the US General Accounting Office (GAO, 
2003), these facts actually reflect that a nation as large and complex as the US cannot be 
turned on a dime: America is still vulnerable (Flynn, 2002). In this section, I outline three 
problems that seem to be particularly acute for further attention. The first one –the 
preparedness of local public health systems to manage biological attacks– is currently a key 
topic of discussion in government administration and is largely relayed by medias. The 
possibilities of imminent attacks that may result from a US-led war on Iraq increase the 
general threats. The two other vulnerabilities –security of the water supply system and security 
of seaports– have been less considered until now.   
 
Chemical and biological attacks: public health systems still unprepared 
Are local public health responders and emergency services prepared to deal with 
biological or chemical attacks? That question is important, as those responders are the front 
line for ensuring the public’s health and safety in case of an attack and also because response 
to anthrax mailings was not really reassuring on that point. The initial identification of the 
nature of attacks has actually been really difficult. In particular, while detecting a chemical 
                                                 
13 The recent creation of the Department of Homeland Security, into which both the CIAO and NIPC are now 
transferred, also constitutes an important development from a government’s vantage point (White House, 2003).  
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attack is generally not a problem, detecting a bioattack may be really problematic. Moreover, 
the poor capacity of authorities in autumn 2001 to organize and coordinate themselves even 
after anthrax was identified shows the lack of preparedness to deal with those emerging risks 
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)14. While one generally assumes that 
healthcare systems are adequately prepared for terrorism incidents, the reality strongly differs 
(Barbera, Macintyre, and DeAtley, 2001; Graham, 2002). National preparation could be a 
very long and costly process15. 
 The multicountry outbreak of atypical pneumonia referred to as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) might be quite illustrative on that point, as it still remains 
unexplained. It also showed the potential ubiquity of such phenomena made possible by 
commercial aviation network. At the beginning of April 2003, nearly 2,500 suspected and/or 
probable SARS cases – including 89 deaths – have been reported to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) from 18 countries around the world (WHO, 2003). That crisis also 
raised the question of preparedness, as it was the first time in the agency's 55-year history that 
it has issued a global alert against travel to a specific region or country because of an 
infectious disease.  
 
Water systems 
The water supply is not an infrastructure of interdependent networks over the country: 
water systems are in most cases owned and operated by local water companies as well as 
maintained by local authorities. That local level’s involvement in security differs highly from 
one region to another and is usually slow in adopting new safety technology. Most of those 
water systems have still not implemented any testing and monitoring capacity of public water 
supplies for pathogenic contaminants. Even locally, the contamination of such a system would 
                                                 
14 Two years ago, the RAND conducted a nation-wide study to measure the degree of preparedness of local 
health and emerging services to chemical and biological attacks. Such a study is interesting as it offers a broad 
overview through two measures: (1) whether the respondent organizations have a plan to address the particular 
incident and (2) among those with plan, whether the plan has been exercised in the last two years. The studied 
scenario was not a large-scale attack but a moderately size chemical/biological one (200 injuries). Based on the 
survey results, plans and exercises are more common for chemical incidents than for biological ones but remain 
small in both cases. More problematic is the fact that for the biological incident scenario, less than 7 percent of 
any type of local organizations (police, fire, public health, offices of emergency management, emergency 
medical services, hospitals) positively answered to the two questions. Moreover, one-quarter of biological 
incident exercises developed by hospitals and local public health agencies did not test how they would 
communicate with police, fire and emergency medical services (Fricker, Jacobson and Davis, 2002).  
15 From 1996 to 1999, the Federal government provided WMD response training to 134,000 first responders, 
only 2 percent of whom received hands-on training with live chemical agents. Moreover, 134,000 fall short of 
the estimated 9 million first responders to be trained in the US (Council of Foreign Relations, 2002). 
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inflict thousands of injuries or even deaths that would be immediately highly publicized as the 
inability of authorities to provide safely citizens with the basic element of life. 
 
Seaports  
As I pointed out earlier in the discussion, on 9/11, the terrorists did not use 
sophisticated weapons but box cutters and obliged federal authorities to order the closing of 
US airspace to all flights. Using a few contaminated envelopes, attackers obliged to seriously 
consider the possibility to temporary close the whole postal network in the US. It is obvious 
that if an attack –whatever the source– were to happen next month involving the sea 
transportation network, the alternative would be likely the same: does the closing of all the 
ports around the nation have to be ordered? Does the transportation system carrying millions 
of tons of trade per day to the country have to be stopped? 
As mentioned in a recent report by the Council of Foreign Relations, a closure of US ports for 
several weeks would impact on the whole industry. If an attack uses a container, as letter or 
aircraft have been used, it would raise concern about the 20,000 containers arriving in US 
ports every day as well as the whole container traffic worldwide. For instance, megaports 
such as Singapore and Rotterdam would have to close some of their gates to prevent 
containers piling up on their limited pier space (Flynn, 2002). As a result of a global 
interdependence, global commerce would be in danger. As of today, such a question still 
often gets left out of discussions regarding US critical infrastructure security (Council of 
Foreign Relations, 2002). 
 
Getting over with myths 
 
On a more general level it is worth noting three recurrent views that strongly limit the 
development of collective initiatives to deal efficiently with emerging vulnerabilities in 
critical infrastructures. They are some key issues all countries will have to seriously consider 
and put as soon as possible on the agenda of the highest executive levels in order to be 
prepared to manage emerging large-scale risks. 
  
Myth 1. Only the US is vulnerable 
9/11 events and anthrax mailings occurred in the US. However, had those events 
occurred in another industrialized country, the crisis would have been the same or even worse 
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as those issues have not yet been integrated in a national strategy abroad. Every country is, 
however, highly dependent on the reliable operation of its critical networks. Even if the US is 
often cited in the medias as the first target for terrorists, no country should underestimate the 
vulnerability of its critical infrastructure. There are at least three reasons for that. First, 
according to experts on terrorism, European countries also face a dangerous expansion of 
terrorist groups in recent years (Assemblée Nationale, 2002). Second, threats do not come 
only from terrorism. Malicious acts, which may have nothing to do with terrorism, would 
inflict the same debilitating impact on a nation or a group of nations by paralyzing critical 
networks. Third, even if this contribution focuses on emerging vulnerabilities, more 
traditional sources of catastrophic risks remain, such as natural disasters and technological 
failures. They are not specific to the US. For instance, storms in France in December 1999 as 
well as ice storm in Canada in January 1998 destroyed the largest part of the electricity 
network of those countries, reminding the major collapse of all the Kobe infrastructures after 
the 1995 earthquake. 
 
Myth 2. Managing new vulnerabilities does not require preparedness 
Members of the government as well as most CEOs and top-level executives may have 
to face unpleasant and unexpected unknown situations due to the potential breakdown of 
critical infrastructures in the short term. A recent survey realized by the Council of 
Competitiveness in 2002–a Washington, DC-based group of CEOs, university presidents and 
labor unions leaders– found that only 70% of senior executives said they were concerned 
about a terrorist attack to their business. Half of those had done anything about it16.  
New types of crisis, however, are going to inflict irreversible consequences to the 
involved organizations, and that faster than ever. Being too optimistic by simply pretending 
that preparedness is unnecessary is clearly not a viable long-term strategy17. Hence, it must be 
well understood that preparation and collective work on large-scale emerging risks may 
constitute the unique framework to do a better job in crisis time (Gilbert, 2002; Guilhou and 
Lagadec, 2002). Such an anticipative work would even open the door to success as being a 
clear competitive advantage. The cost of preparation falls short of the significant 
consequences of emerging risks18. And terrorists could learn and adapt their strategies more 
                                                 
16 Cited in Wharton School (2003). 
17 As Norman Augustine made the point few years ago, more than 50% of CEO’s have no crisis plan, but 97% 
are confident that they will respond well if crisis occurs (Augustine, 1995). 
18 The impact of the four 9/11 hijackings is illustrative. 
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rapidly than some official circles (Rosenthal, Charles, ‘T Hart, 1989). When the attacks occur, 
time for learning is over19. 
 
Myth 3. Building trust is an easy task 
Making critical networks safer is a task that involves not only public entities and 
officials, but private entities and officials as well. The need for public-private partnerships has 
become necessary for many reasons that are developed above. Creating and developing such 
partnerships, however, is not an easy task: the habits, cultures, references and attempts of the 
two sectors differ in numerous ways (Godard, Henry, Lagadec and Michel-Kerjan, 2002). The 
integration of the private sector into domestic preparedness programs may take time and 
create strong opposition because of historical reasons, cost concerns20, and legal impediments 
as well (Kayyem and Chang, 2002). The alternative –stopping a whole activity– is, 
conversely, not really attractive. Above all, developing collective initiatives requires being 
able to trust the other stakeholders. The existence of trust would be an essential element of all 
enduring and successful public-private partnerships. That aspect of any partnership is a key 
stake as one of the most fundamental qualities of trust has been known for ages. Trust is 
fragile (Slovic, 1993, 1999; Seligman, 2000). Crisis episodes –perhaps more than any other 
situations– can destroy it very easily. The problem of Trust is not the least one.   
 
Concluding notes: a collective responsibility 
 
After the recognition by the White House of those issues as critical, after 5 years of 
vulnerability assessment and creation of multi-level partnerships to mitigate the risk in the 
United States, the 9/11 terrorists attacks as well as the anthrax mailings revealed cascading 
impacts due to strong critical infrastructure sector interdependencies, which still often get left 
out of analyses regarding US critical infrastructure security (Gordon, 2003; GAO, 2003). 
Those events also revealed that the route would be nothing but a very long, complex and 
costly one.  
                                                 
19 Recent research on anticipation versus improvisation as sources of organization resilience while experiencing 
an unexpected situation can be fruitful to consider; see for instance Rerup (2001), Hatch (1997), Berliner (1994). 
20 For instance, regarding seaport security, “US-bound cargo ships preparing to leave any foreign port must now 
file a manifest with US customs inspectors certifying the contents of every container. The new regulation, 
designed to prevent bombs entering the US in containers, will adds costs, delay shipments, and may result in the 
shutdown of next day delivery services” (Wharton School, 2003). 
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The US initiative may constitute a framework for other countries to develop their own 
national strategy by adapting it to national particularities. Two elements appear fundamental 
for succeeding: proactive behavior and challenge. Proactive behavior: do not wait for a series 
of events before preparing the country and developing new partnerships. Challenge: those 
risks are nothing but large-scale risks involving whole critical networks; local answers –when 
they exist and are regularly and efficiently tested– will not be longer sufficient: they have to 
be part of a national or even international strategy of security improvement.  
The European Cooperation on Postal Security closed meeting in Paris last autumn, 
which was organized in that spirit and that involved top-executives from postal services and 
authorities from no less than 26 countries21, may constitute an initiative to follow.  
In the end, the security of critical infrastructures is a matter of collective responsibility 
–collective courage I would say. With current high tensions on the international scene and as 
attackers have only to be lucky once, the next two years may be critical. 
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